Defense in Depth
Security & Memory-Safe Rust
Crate-wide #![forbid(unsafe_code)], path traversal prevention, and HTML sanitization.
1. Crate-Wide #![forbid(unsafe_code)] (ADR-0001)
Both src/lib.rs and src/main.rs declare #![forbid(unsafe_code)] at the crate root. Any attempt to introduce an unsafe block fails compilation immediately. Combined with cargo-deny and cargo-audit in CI, NucleusFlow eliminates buffer overflows, use-after-free bugs, and undefined memory behavior across its content processing pipeline.
2. Path Traversal Prevention (ADR-0003)
Static site generators read content files, templates, and static assets from disk and mirror directory structures into output trees. NucleusFlow enforces strict path validation at every I/O boundary:
FileContentProcessor(sanitize_path): Rejects any path containing..parent traversal segments, null bytes (\0), or leading/root escapes before opening a file, returningProcessError::InvalidInput.HtmlGenerator::copy_assets_to: Verifies that every cached relative asset path contains no..components before creating subdirectories or writing output files.- Property-Based Fuzzing (
proptest 1.6): Path sanitization invariants are continuously fuzz-tested against arbitrary string inputs in the test suite.
3. HTML Allowlist Sanitization & XSS Prevention
When ContentProcessor::new().with_sanitization() is active, MarkdownProcessor enforces a two-layer filter on rendered HTML:
- Tag Allowlist (
ALLOWED_HTML_TAGS): Only permitsp,div,span,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,ul,ol,li,a,img,code,pre,blockquote,em,strong,del,table,thead,tbody,tr,th,td,sup,sub,br, andhr. Any unapproved tag (such as<script>,<iframe>,<object>,<embed>,<form>, or<style>) triggersProcessingError::HtmlSanitizationError. - Suspicious Pattern Blocker: Scans for
javascript:,data:,vbscript:,onclick,onerror,onload, andeval(, blocking dangerous URI schemes and inline event handlers. - Escaped
<meta>Injection:HtmlGeneratorescapes&,<,>,", and'in all<meta>tag names and values before inserting them into<head>.
4. Deterministic Denial-of-Service (DoS) Budgets
Every stage enforces explicit upper bounds so untrusted or malformed files cannot exhaust process memory:
| Resource Budget | Default Limit | Enforced By |
|---|---|---|
| Markdown Content Size | 10 MB (10,485,760 bytes) | MarkdownProcessor::MAX_CONTENT_SIZE & ContentConfig |
| Frontmatter Metadata Size | 64 KB (65,536 bytes) | ContentConfig::max_metadata_size |
| Template File Size | 1 MB (1,048,576 bytes) | TemplateConfig::max_template_size |
| Template Cache Memory | 100 MB (104,857,600 bytes) | TemplateConfig::max_cache_size |
| Configuration File Size | 1 MB (1,048,576 bytes) | ConfigBuilder::MAX_CONFIG_SIZE |
| Generated Output Size | 100 MB (104,857,600 bytes) | OutputConfig::max_output_size |
| Environment Variable Filter | Blocks PATH, HOME, USER, SHELL | ConfigBuilder::is_safe_env_var |
5. Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (RFC 9116)
Report suspected vulnerabilities privately via GitHub Security Advisories or by email to sebastian.rousseau@gmail.com. Machine-readable disclosure metadata is published at /.well-known/security.txt. Initial acknowledgement is provided within 48 hours.